Does OPEC still exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation
Emmanuel Hache () and
Valérie Mignon ()
No 2011-5, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
The aim of this paper is to determine if OPEC acts as a cartel by testing whether the production decisions of the different countries are coordinated and if they have an influence on oil prices. Relying on cointegration and causality tests in both time series and panel settings, our findings show that the OPEC influence has evolved through time, following the changes in the oil pricing system. While the influence of OPEC is found to be important just after the counter-oil shock, our results show that OPEC is price taker on the majority of the considered sub-periods. Finally, by dividing OPEC between savers and spenders, we show that it acts as a cartel mainly with a subgroup of its members.
Keywords: Oil prices; oil production; OPEC; cartel; cointegration; causality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 C23 L11 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cwa, nep-ene and nep-hme
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Journal Article: Does OPEC still exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation (2012)
Working Paper: Does OPEC still exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation (2012)
Working Paper: Does OPEC still exist as a cartel ? An empirical investigation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-5
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