Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Sayantan Ghosal

No 2012-49, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of a strategic market game and the set of the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. In an example, we show that, even when atoms are countably infinite, Cournot-Nash equilibria yield different allocations from the Walras equilibrium allocations of the underlying exchange economy. We partially replicate the exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms without affecting the atomless part while ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game associated with the partially replicated exchange economies approximates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange economy.

Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibrium; strategic market games; limit theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem (2012)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem (2012)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem (2012)
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