Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control
Andreea Cosnita-Langlais () and
Jean-Philippe Tropeano ()
No 2013-22, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
We study the optimal timing of merger control by comparing the pre-and post closing enforcement. Mergers have both pro- and anticompetitive effects, and the parties(the agency and the merging firms) veri able information on them is endogenous: it depends on the timing of the merger control, as well as on some investment in evidence production. The ex post enforcement turns out optimal whenever the costs of providing veri able information on both efficiency gains and market power are sufficiently low, regardless of whether the fi rms know ex ante or not their true merger type.
Keywords: merger control; competition policy; evidence production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L41 K21 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-22
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