Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: An analysis of Article L. 615-7
Thomas Cortade and
Eric Langlais ()
No 2013-37, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
This paper provides an analysis of two damage rules (Lost Pro fit versus Unjust Enrichment) introduced in the French Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle in 2007 (Loi du 27 Octobre 2007, Art. L. 615-7). We use a simple sequential game where both the decisions to infringe and to enforce the patent, as well as the decisions to accomodate, settle or litigate the case, and the outputs decisions (Cournot competition) are endogenous. We characterize the equilibria associated with each rule, and compare their properties. We show that: 1/ the Unjust Enrichment rule provides Patentees with higher damages compensation than the Lost Pro fit one; however, 2/ Lost Profi t induces more deterrence of infringement, and is associated with less trials than Unjust Enrichment; 3/ Unjust Enrichment may deter the Patentee to enforce his right; 4/ when there is a positive probability that the case settles, Patentee's expected utility is higher under Lost Profi t than under Unjust Enrichment.
Keywords: lost profi t rule; unjust enrichment rule; intellectual property rights; patent litigations; pretrial negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K2 K4 L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-law
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Working Paper: Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: An analysis of Article L. 615-7 (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-37
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