Bank Failures and the Source of Strength Doctrine

Vincent Bouvatier, Michael Brei and Xi Yang

No 2014-15, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of bank failures in the US banking system during the recent financial crisis. The analysis employs a dataset on the financial statements of FDIC-insured commercial banks and their bank holding companies, along with information on bank failures, mergers, and acquisitions. The econometric evidence suggests that failed banks have been characterized by significantly higher loan growth rates, well ahead of the financial crisis, coupled with higher exposures to the mortgage market segment and to funding in the form of brokered deposits. We also find evidence that commercial banks have been less likely to fail, when they belonged to well-capitalized and profitable bank holding companies with lower exposures to short-term funding. Our results provide empirical support for the recent modifications in bank regulation and supervision which introduce countercyclical components for capital buffers and a more comprehensive supervision of consolidated banking groups.

Keywords: financial crises; bank failures; bank regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Bank Failures and the Source of Strength Doctrine (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-15

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