A post-Paretian concept of optimality: the “Conditional Agreement Point”

Fabrice Tricou

No 2014-40, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This paper introduces and develops the concept of “conditional agreement point”, defined as the dominating issue (hard optimality) within a certain restricted subset of the set of feasible issues (partial optimality). Such a concept associates individualistic independence (via the operation of individual preferences) and humanistic autonomy (via the social choice of the determined subset). As the “conditional agreement point” assumes a dualistic conception of human beings as self-interest followers and as rule makers, it acknowledges mixed or complex types of behavior and it supports some syntheses between efficiency and justice. Precisely, the notion of CAP permits the reconsideration of classical coordination or cooperation problems such as the bilateral exchange.

Keywords: efficiency and justice; independence and autonomy; bilateral exchange. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D50 D60 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-40

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