The structure of fi nes in the light of political competition
Eric Langlais () and
No 2014-59, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
This paper analyzes the determinants of public law enforcement policies when citizens vote for the timing and level of fi nes. We consider situations where citizens and politicians disagree on the value of the expected social harm associated with some activities. We fi nd that citizens vote for act-based (harm-based) sanctions when they expect that social harm is low (resp high). On the other hand, we show that the equilibrium fines may be higher or lower than the optimal one, depending on the difference between politicians and citizens' expectations.
Keywords: timing of sanction; law enforcement; deterrence; political competition; majority rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H1 K14 K23 K32 K4 Q52 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: The Structure of Fines in the Light of Political Competition (2015)
Working Paper: The structure of fines in the light of political competition (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-59
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Valerie Mignon ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).