De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins

Philippe Batifoulier

No 2014-7, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: One of the most influential “lessons” of the moral hazard theory in health economics is that cost sharing can reduce health spending without damage on health status. This “lesson” has been enormously influential on policy makers. This paper shows that this theoretical and empirical background is deficient and leads to perverse effects: inducement of inequalities and increase in health spending.

Keywords: Aléa moral du patient; partage des coûts; accès aux soins; inégalités; approche institutionnaliste (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 I13 I14 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-7

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