Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards
Andreea Cosnita-Langlais () and
Jean-Philippe Tropeano ()
No 2015-3, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
The purpose of this paper is to study the relative impact of public and private competition law enforcement on antitrust liability. We develop a model with asymmetric information during trial, where the number of cases filed depends on the amount of damages awarded and on the standard of evidence applied either by the public authority or by the judge. Our model predicts that higher damages result in a higher standard of evidence, which is not always welfare improving. We also show that public enforcement better incentivizes pro-competitive practices by allowing a lower standard of evidence. This may lead the public enforcement to outperform the private enforcement.
Keywords: antitrust; public and private enforcement; evidentiary standard. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2015-3
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