Bilan sur le consensus de Jackson Hole
Anne-Marie Rieu-Foucault ()
No 2018-49, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
Before the 2007 crisis, the monetary authorities agreed in Jackson Hole for independence between monetary policy and financial stability. They thus validated the mandate of central banks with the objective of price stability. This point, however, is debated. This paper takes the arguments that led to the Jackson Hole consensus before the crisis and then revisits them in the light of the 2007 crisis. Financial imbalances and the existence of a risk-taking channel need to be addressed by economic policy. After the crisis, the monetary authorities chose to implement macroprudential policies to address this concern but did not question the independence between monetary policy and financial stability, resulting in the separation of monetary policy and macro-prudential policies. The limitations of macroprudential tools may, however, lead to changes in the central bank's strategy or mandate for the integration of a financial stability objective into monetary policy.
Keywords: Monetary policy; Financial Stability; Central banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2018-49
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