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Arbitrage entre assurance et auto-assurance contre les risques naturels

Guibril Zerbo

No 2024-30, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This article studies the effect of preferences on an individual's optimal choice between insurance demand and self-insurance in a risk context and then in an ambiguous context. The innovative idea in this paper is to introduce ambiguity about the effectiveness of self-insurance to understand the nature of the relationship between insurance demand and self-insurance demand. We show that an increase in risk aversion increases the demand for insurance and decreases the demand for self-insurance. However, when risk is introduced on the effectiveness of self-insurance, we show that the individual still prefers self-insurance to market insurance. We also show that when ambiguity is introduced on the efficacy of self-insurance, the individual always prefers market insurance to self-insurance. Finally, we determine the conditions under which the individual's self-insurance effort is higher or lower under ambiguity than risk.

Keywords: Natural risks; arbitration; insurance; self-insurance; efficacy; risk; ambiguity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G22 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-rmg and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-30

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