Information Release in Second–Price Auctions

Cristián Troncoso-Valverde

Serie Working Papers from Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can release information to prospective bidders before bidders choose trading partners. I provide sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in which both sellers release all available information. Contrary to previous findings in the literature, the existence of this equilibrium holds true even if there are only two bidders in the market. Thus, the findings of this paper provides support to the idea that competition among sellers improves informational efficiency relatively to monopoly

Keywords: Competing Auctions; Information Structures; Private Provision of Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://repositorio.udd.cl/bitstream/handle/11447/105/wp15.pdf?sequence=1

Related works:
Journal Article: Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions (2018)
Working Paper: Information Provision in Competing Auctions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dsr:wpaper:15

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