Hiring people-like-yourself: a representation of discrimination on the job market

Ariane Szafarz

No 07-21.RS, DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper offers a new representation of discrimination on the job market based on the most recent findings in the socio-psychological academic literature about human behaviour. Put it simply, it is assumed that the agents prefer working with people like themselves. This "affinity" principle is modelled through a distance between an individual (the candidate for a job) and the staff of the firm. Contrary to the classical view according to which discrimination results from asymmetric information, this new model provides a rationale for the presence of discriminative attitudes on the job market even when full information is available on the skill levels of all candidates for a working position.

Keywords: discrimination; affinity; skill. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J70 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 p.
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published by: DULBEA - Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels

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Working Paper: Hiring people-like-yourself: a representation of discrimination on the job market (2007)
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