Are promises indebting? Political economy of electoral promises
Etienne Farvaque () and
No 08-14.RS, DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
This article exposes the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment
Keywords: Lobbies; Promises; Elections; Electoral competition; Lies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 p.
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