HIERARCHIES, INCENTIVES AND COLLUSION IN MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT

A Mishra
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ajit Mishra and Ashok K. Mishra ()

No 67, Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics from Economic Studies, University of Dundee

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Related works:
Journal Article: Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement (2002)
Working Paper: Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement (2000)
Working Paper: HIERARCHIES, INCENTIVES AND COLLUSION IN A MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT (1996)
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