Political Uncertainty and the Choice of Debt Sources
Hamdi Ben-Nasr (),
Lobna Bouslimi (),
M. Shahid Ebrahim () and
Rui Zhong ()
Additional contact information
Hamdi Ben-Nasr: Qatar University
Lobna Bouslimi: Concordia University
No 2019_08, Department of Economics Working Papers from Durham University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper studies the effect of political uncertainty on the choice of debt sources. We find a positive relationship between political uncertainty stemming from elections and the proportion of bank loans over total debts, especially when elections are closely contested. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger in opaque firms and more financially constrained firms as well as firms from countries with weaker shareholder rights, labor protection, creditor rights and national governance.
Keywords: Bank Debt; Public Debt; National Election; Political Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 G24 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Journal Article: Political uncertainty and the choice of debt sources (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dur:durham:2019_08
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