Nejat Anbarci and
Ozgur KÄ±brÄ±s ()
Additional contact information
Ozgur KÄ±brÄ±s: SabancÄ± University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Özgür Kıbrıs ()
No 2022_02, Working Papers from Durham University Business School
In dispute resolution, arbitrator assignments are decentralized and also incorporate partiesâ€™ preferences, in total contrast to referee assignments in sports. We suggest that there can be gains (i) in dispute resolution from centralizing the allocation by bundling the newly arriving cases, and (ii) in sports from incorporating teamsâ€™ preferences. To that end, we introduce a class of Arbiter Assignment Problems where a set of matches (e.g., disputes or games), each made up of two agents, are to be assigned arbiters (e.g., arbitrators or referees). On this domain, the question of how agents in a match should compromise becomes critical. To evaluate the value of an arbiter for a match, we introduce the (Rawlsian) notion of depth, defined as the arbiterâ€™s worst position in the two agentsâ€™ rankings. Depth optimal assignments minimize depth over matches, and they are Pareto optimal. We first introduce and analyze depth optimal (and fair) mechanisms. We then propose and study strategy-proof mechanisms.
Keywords: Arbiter; arbitration; dispute resolution; assignment; mechanism; depth optimality; fairness; unanimity compromise; strategy-proofness; referee; sports; football. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.durham.ac.uk/business/media/durham-uni ... t-us/EconWP22_02.pdf main text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dur:durham:2022_02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Durham University Business School Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, England. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IT Office ().