Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector of Pakistan

Faiza A. Chaudary, Marc Goergen and Shoeb I. Syed
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Faiza A. Chaudary: LUMS

Governance Working Papers from East Asian Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract: La Porta et al. (1998) assign Pakistan, a common-law country, the maximum score of 5 for their anti-director rights index. Pakistan should therefore be a country with good investor protection attracting large amounts of investments. However, the reality could not be more different. Pakistan has been lagging behind other, comparable Asian economies in terms of incoming foreign direct investment as well as GDP-per-capita growth. This paper focuses on the Pakistani banking sector. The paper analyses the banks ownership and control structure. It finds that Pakistan has its own idiosyncrasies, which are difficult to associate with La Porta et al.s characterisation of corporate governance and investor protection in common-law countries. The paper also reviews the recent reforms of corporate governance.

Keywords: Corporate governance; corporate control; Banks; Pakistan; Emerging Markets; investor protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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