Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly

Rupayan Pal

Governance Working Papers from East Asian Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation.

Keywords: Emission tax; price competition; product differentiation; quantity competition; strategic managerial delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 L13 Q50 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.eaber.org/node/22935 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.eaber.org/node/22935 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22935 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://eaber.org/node/22935)

Related works:
Journal Article: DELEGATION AND EMISSION TAX IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY (2012)
Working Paper: Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eab:govern:22935

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Governance Working Papers from East Asian Bureau of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shiro Armstrong ().