Technology Adoption in a Differentiated Duopoly - Cournot versus Bertrand

Rupayan Pal

Microeconomics Working Papers from East Asian Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper compares equilibrium technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly under two alternative modes of product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. It shows that the cost of technology has differential impact on technology adoption, that is, on cost-efficiency of the industry, under two alternative modes of product market competition. The possibility of ex post cost asymmetry between firms is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If the cost of technology is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost-efficiency than Cournot competition provided that the cost reducing effect of the technology is high. On the other hand, if the technology reduces the marginal cost of production by a very low amount, Cournot competition may lead to higher cost-efficiency than Bertrand competition.

Keywords: Differentiated duopoly; limit-pricing; price effect; selection effect; technology adoption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L11 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.eaber.org/node/22388 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 301 [REDIRECT LOOP] Moved Permanently (http://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eaber.org/node/22388)

Related works:
Journal Article: Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand (2010)
Working Paper: Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus bertrand (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eab:microe:22388

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics Working Papers from East Asian Bureau of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shiro Armstrong ().