Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting

Hervé Crès and Mich Tvede

No 816, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: In absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.

Keywords: Production externalities; majority voting; portfolio diversification; general equilibrium; stakeholder governance; mean voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D52 D71 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2006-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hec.fr/var/fre/storage/original/applica ... d6ed1082ffa07609.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Portfolio Diversification and Internalization of Production Externalities through Majority Voting (2005)
Working Paper: Portfolio Diversification and Internalization of Production Externalities through Majority Voting (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0816

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Antoine Haldemann ().