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Asset Purchase Bailouts and Endogenous Implicit Guarantees

Eric Mengus

No 1248, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: This paper shows that bailouts of private agents can optimally take the form of the purchase of a defaulting asset, even if this also means paying off external asset holders. When anticipated, this form of bailouts leads to an endogenous implicit guarantee, where even an intrinsically worthless asset may be traded at a positive price. In the presence of borrowing constraints and imperfectly observable private liquidity needs, direct transfers are imperfect so that, when more constrained agents are also more exposed to a given asset, the compensation through asset purchases becomes optimal. I then show that this possibility of implicit guarantee is amplified by other frictions as risk-shifting and ultimately leads to a coordination problem for selecting stores of liquidity. Finally, I derive policy implications for financial regulation and international capital flows.

Keywords: Implicit guarantees; bailouts; intrinsically worthless assets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 F34 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2017-12-20, Revised 2018-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Asset purchase bailouts and endogenous implicit guarantees (2023) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1248

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