Cancel Culture and Social Learning

Ivan Marinovic, Davide Cianciaruso and Ilan Guttman
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Ivan Marinovic: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Davide Cianciaruso: HEC Paris
Ilan Guttman: Leonard N. Stern School of Business

No 1434, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: "We study social learning and information transmission in a sender-receiver game wherein senders may be attacked (``cancelled'') for challenging the status-quo beliefs. We find that cancellations (and self-censorship) don't arise unless there is a positive probability the receiver gains a direct benefit from attacking dissenting speakers. In this case, even receivers who bear a cost from cancelling speakers attack dissenting speakers, as a means to build a reputation for ``toughness''. By doing so, not only they deter future dissenters from revealing their private information but also influence the decision making process. Surprisingly, sometimes the larger the disagreement between speakers and receivers, the more information transmission is elicited in equilibrium. "

Keywords: Cancel culture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2022-01-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1434

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4011359

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