Lobbying in the EU

Nilanjana Dutt, Miguel Espinosa, Ruyue Li, Johan Rath and Elie Sung
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Nilanjana Dutt: Bocconi University
Miguel Espinosa: Bocconi University
Ruyue Li: Boston University
Johan Rath: Bocconi University
Elie Sung: HEC Paris

No 1577, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: While we know a lot about how lobbying works in the United States, we know much less about how it operates in the European Union (EU), despite the EU's major global influence. The EU's complex system of governance creates unique challenges and opportunities for corporate lobbying, with important implications for policymaking. This paper helps fill that gap by building a new dataset on lobbying activities in the EU and documenting how companies engage with key institutions like the European Commission and the European Parliament. We also compare lobbying in the EU and the U.S. and examine what drives companies to lobby. Our findings raise important questions about corporate influence in EU policymaking and provide a foundation for future research.

Keywords: Lobbying; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2025-06-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1577

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5260257

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