Managerial appraisal and compensation: The case of Spain

Joan E. Ricart () and Jose M. Corrales
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Joan E. Ricart: IESE Business School, Postal: Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
Jose M. Corrales: IESE Business School, Postal: Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN

No D/413, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: This paper explores some fundamental tasks associated with corporate governance: manager appraisal and compensation. Most of the empirical research in this area has been centered on Anglo-Saxon countries. Some European countries, such as Spain, have a very different governance tradition. Given this context, the work presented here has two objectives: 1.- To describe existing appraisal and compensation practices in Spain, comparing them with those used in the USA. 2.- To study the determinants of CEO compensation, and the relationship between CEO compensation and certain Board practices, using agency theory

Keywords: Appraisal; compensation; agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2000-03-24
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0413

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