Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games

Xavier Vives

No D/619, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: We provide sufficient conditions in finite-horizon multi-stage games for the value function of each player, associated to extremal Markov perfect equilibria, to display strategic complementarities and for the contemporaneous equilibrium to be increasing in the state variables.

Keywords: Markov game; supermodularity; two-stage game; adjustment costs; learning curve; network effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006-03-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0619

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