Network industries and regulatory jurisdiction

Francesc Trillas

No D/859, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: This paper presents new developments in the economics of federalism to analyze the determinants of specific investments in network industries and the interaction between structural and behavioral regulation. Central or federal policy making is more focused and specialized and makes it more difficult for interest groups to organize. Under some conditions, however, central powers will be associated with more underinvestment than local powers. The latter cannot afford specific regulation due to high fixed administrative costs, but may use other policy objectives as a commitment device. When technology allows the introduction of competition in some segments, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architecture of regulation expand. Liberalization will typically require institutional cooperation, but cooperation has costs and may be inhibited by distributional concerns.

Keywords: Network Industries; Regulatory Jurisdiction; Cooperation; Liberalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010-05-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0859

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