Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership
José Azar (),
Martin Schmalz and
Isabel Tecu ()
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José Azar: IESE Business School, Postal: IESE Business School. Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN, http://www.iese.edu/es/index-default.html
Isabel Tecu: Charles River Associates, Postal: Boston, Massachusetts, United States, http://www.crai.com/
No D/1169, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are ten times larger than what is ¿presumed likely to enhance market power¿ by antitrust authorities. We find a robust correlation between within-route changes in common ownership concentration and route-level changes in ticket prices, also when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large investors. We conclude that a hidden social cost ¿ reduced product market competition ¿ accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.
Keywords: Competition; Ownership; Diversification; Pricing; Antitrust; Governance; Product Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L10 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 82 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-1169
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