Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm

José Azar ()
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José Azar: IESE Business School, Postal: IESE Business School. Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN

No D/1170, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: This paper develops a model of firm behavior in the context of oligopoly and portfolio diversification by shareholders. Competition for shareholder votes among potential managers seeking corporate office leads to internalization and aggregation of shareholder objectives, including shareholdings in other firms, and the fact that shareholders are consumers and workers of the firms. When all shareholders hold market portfolios, firms that are formally separate behave as a single firm. I introduce new indices that capture the internalization effects from consumer/worker control, and discuss implications for antitrust, stakeholder theory, and the boundaries of the firm.

Keywords: Common Ownership; Theory of the Firm; MHHI; Oligopoly; Stakeholder Theory; Firm Boundaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L10 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2017-03-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-1170

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