Information Revelation in an English Auction

Nicolas Gothelf

No 2010_003, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper asks whether revealing the identity of dropping bidders is in the interest of the auctioneer in an ascending price auction with asymmetric bidders and interdependent values. We show that revealing no information about bidders’ identities may increase the expected revenue. In this setup, we identify the underlying mechanism for the failure of the often-heard recommendation that more transparency increases revenue. We also consider bidder ranking over auction formats.

Keywords: Information revelation; identity; English auctions; market design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 p.
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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