Benchmarking Politicians

Antonio Estache and Renaud Foucart

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms,but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms.A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) orcorruption (moral hazard). Information could improve, if independent experts assess achievementsas compared to commitments, allowing independent judges to investigate possible corruption.We find that while good experts are always beneficial as they increase transparency,the impact of the quality of judges is ambiguous. Above a threshold, with risk-averse socialplanners, good judges increase the incentive-compatible punishment of politicians, at the costof possible judiciary mistakes.

Pages: 23 p.
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Benchmarking Politicians (2013)
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