Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable

Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock and Frederic Vermeulen

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for house-hold consumption patterns. We start by de ning a revealed preference characterization of e¢ cient householdconsumption when the marriage is stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is indi-vidually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show that this revealed preference characterization generatestestable conditions even if there is only a single consumption observation per household and individual pref-erences are heterogeneous across households. In addition, the characterization allows for identifying theintrahousehold decision structure (including the sharing rule) under the same minimalistic assumptions. Anapplication to Dutch household data demonstrates the empirical usefulness of our theoretical results.

Keywords: marriage market; stable matching; Pareto efficient household consumption; testable implications; sharing rule identification; preference heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C78 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 p.
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable (2017)
Working Paper: Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable (2017)
Working Paper: Household consumption when the marriage is stable (2014)
Working Paper: Household consumption when marriage is stable (2014)
Working Paper: Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable (2014)
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