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Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace

Paola Conconi (), Nicolas Sahuguet () and Maurizio Zanardi ()

No ECARES 2015-33, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Keywords: interstate conflicts; democratic peace; elections; term limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 F00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2015-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Electoral Incentives, Term Limits, and the Sustainability of Peace (2018)
Working Paper: Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Electoral incentives, term limits and the sustainability of peace (2015) Downloads
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