Household Responses to cash Transfers

Denni Tommasi

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper estimates a collective model of the household and investigates how parents reach decisions to allocate household resources. Using data from PROGRESA, we test the restrictions of collective rationality on a large variety of specifications and show that, contrary to previous results, this modeling approach cannot rationalize the household decision process. We provide some evidence that the observed inefficiency is driven by the group receiving the cash transfers. These results are consistent with the idea that a possible indirect effect of CCT programs may be to enhance disagreements between the spouses which trigger an inefficient allocation of their resources.

Keywords: collective model; bargaining power; efficiency; PROGRESA; conditional cash transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 I38 J12 J16 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 p.
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published by:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/2297 ... TOMMASI-hosehold.pdf Full text for the whole work, or for a work part (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Household Responses to Cash Transfers (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/229749

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/229749

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().