EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses ?

Emmanuelle Auriol (), Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis ()

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We study the impact of institutional characteristics of national and supranational regulation on the effectiveness of both types of regulation. We focus on four institutional dimensions: regulatory capacity, accountability, commitment and fiscal capacity. We show how supranational regulation may reduce or worsen the challenges imposed by national institutional weaknesses. The analysis allows an identification of the costs and benefits of supranational regulation in very diversified institutional contexts. It also explains why some desirable changes from a global welfare perspective are unlikely to take place unless the losers of market integration are somehow compensated when national regulation is unlikely to do so as a result of some of its weaknesses.

Pages: 21 p.
Date: 2017-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published by:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/2491 ... cansupranational.pdf Full text for the whole work, or for a work part (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses? (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses? (2018)
Working Paper: Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses? (2018)
Working Paper: Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses? (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/249109

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/249109

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().

 
Page updated 2021-09-18
Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/249109