Childcare and Commitment within Households
No ECARES 2017-51, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
This paper proposes a semi-cooperative marital decision process to explain parentalunderinvestment in childcare. First, parents collectively choose the amount of labor tosupply and, in a second step, they each choose the amount of childcare as the outcomeof a Cournot game. Non-cooperative behavior stems from the lack of a credible commitmentbetween spouses regarding the amount of childcare they each supply. Thetheoretical model is able to reproduce that parental time with children increases bothwith an individual's education and with that of his/her partner. The limited commitmentproblem leads to an underinvestment in childcare and, hence, child quality:compared to the efficient provision of childcare, the semi-cooperative framework leadsto an amount of child quality that is 45% lower.
Keywords: Time Use; Childcare; Education; Semi-Cooperative Model; Structural Estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Childcare and commitment within households (2018)
Working Paper: Childcare and Commitment within Households (2017)
Working Paper: Childcare and commitment within households (2014)
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