Market Design for the Environment
Estelle Cantillon and
Aurelie Slechten
No 2024-02, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Abstract:
The main argument in favor of markets in environmental contexts is the same as in other contexts: their ability to promote efficient allocations and production. But environmental problems bring their own challenges: their underlying bio-physical processes - and the technologies to monitor them - constrain what is feasible or even desirable. This chapter illustrates the main design dimensions in environmental markets, the trade-offs involved and their impact on performance, through the lens of a regulated market for pollution rights (the EU emissions trading scheme) and a voluntary market for the provision of environmental services (the global market for carbon credits). While both markets eventually contribute to climate change mitigation, their organisation as a “pollution market”, for the former, and as a “provision market”, for second, means that different design considerations take precedence. Both markets also face challenges: volatile prices in the EU emissions scheme and low trust for voluntary carbon markets. We discuss how alternative design options could address those.Keywords: Natural
Keywords: Natural capital; ecosystem services; tradable quotas; property rights; pollution; carbon markets; voluntary markets; externalities; asset design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 p.
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ene and nep-env
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Chapter: Market Design for the Environment (2024)
Working Paper: Market Design for the Environment (2023)
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