Can Lotteries help fix Procurement Failures? A Review of Theory and Evidence

Antonio Estache, Renaud Foucart and Tomas Serebrisky

No 2024-18, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We review the potential costs and benefits of adding a lottery component to both discretionary negotiated procurement procedures and rule-based auction procedures. We show that adding a lottery component to auctions can increase quality and reduce issues related to limited liability, renegotiations, and bid-rigging. In the case of discretionary negotiated procedures, lotteries anchored in a diversity of randomization options can also reduce corruption risks. These include randomizing between bidders and between decision committee members, or randomizing audits.

Keywords: rules; discretion; procurement; lotteries; corruption; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 p.
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published by:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/3782 ... KY-can-lotteries.pdf Œuvre complète ou partie de l'œuvre (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/378275

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/378275

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().