Pandering to the Future

Benjamin Blumenthal

No 2026-18, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: I study a model of delegated experimentation in which actions signal agents’ underlying type—careerist or partisan. I show that careerist agents pander to the future by choosing the action mostlikely to be preferred ex post by the principal. I discuss when and why this behaviour differsfrom selecting the principal’s ex ante preferred action, which balances static and dynamic learningbenefits. I conclude my analysis by considering implications for agents’ responsiveness to changesin actions’ popularity, for the benefits and costs of transparency, and for the role of partisanshipstructures.

Keywords: delegation; experimentation; transparancy; accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 p.
Date: 2026-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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