Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

Marco Catenaro and Jean-Pierre Vidal

No 259, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary. JEL Classification: E61, H87

Keywords: International Fiscal Issues; Policy Co-ordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
Note: 76996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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