Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring

Reint Gropp and Jukka Vesala

No 302, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities. JEL Classification: G21, G28

Keywords: banking; deposit insurance; Market Monitoring; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
Note: 56868
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (136)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp302.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring (2004)
Working Paper: Deposit insurance, moral hazard, and market monitoring (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2004302

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from European Central Bank 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Official Publications ().