The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries

Rolf Strauch, Mark Hallerberg and Juergen von Hagen

No 419, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This paper examines the development of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries, and their impact of public finances since the mid-1980s. It presents a new data set on institutional reforms and their impact in Europe. Empirical pattern confirm our prediction that more stringent fiscal rules exist under large coalition governments, while the centralisation of budgetary procedures is the main form of fiscal governance elsewhere. In addition, the centralisation of procedures does not restrain public debt in countries more prone to a rules-based approach, whereas more stringent fiscal rules seem to support fiscal discipline in almost all EU countries. JEL Classification: H11, H61, H62

Keywords: budgetary procedures; European public finances; fiscal rules; public indebtedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
Note: 339130
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2004419

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