Interlinking securities settlement systems: a strategic commitment?

Karlo Kauko

No 427, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: Central securities depositories (CSDs) have opened mutual links, but most of them are seldom used. Why are idle links established? By allowing a foreign CSD to offer services through the link the domestic CSD invites competition. The domestic CSD can determine the cost efficiency of the rival by charging suitable fees, and prevent it from becoming more competitive than the domestic CSD. By inviting the competitor the domestic CSD can commit itself not to charge monopoly fees for secondary market services. This enables the domestic CSD to charge high fees in the primary market without violating investors' participation constraints. JEL Classification: G29, L13

Keywords: access pricing; central securities depositories; network industries; securities settlement systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp427.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interlinking securities settlement systems: A strategic commitment? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2005427

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from European Central Bank 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Official Publications ().