Delegated portfolio management: a survey of the theoretical literature

Livio Stracca

No 520, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This paper provides a selective review of the theoretical literature on delegated portfolio management as a principal-agent relationship. The main focus of the paper is to review the analytical issues raised by the peculiar nature of the delegated portfolio management relationship within the broader class of principalagent models. In particular, the paper discusses the performance of linear vs. nonlinear compensation contracts in a single-period setting, the possible effects of limited liability of portfolio managers, the role of reputational concerns in a multiperiod framework, and the incentives to noise trading. In addition, the paper deals with some general equilibrium dimensions and asset pricing implications of delegated portfolio management. The paper also suggests some directions for future research. JEL Classification: D82, G11

Keywords: adverse selection; agency; Delegated portfolio management; moral hazard; principal-agent models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09
Note: 335958
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Journal Article: DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: A SURVEY OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2005520

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