Monetary Policy Committees: meetings and outcomes

Jan Marc Berk and Beata K. Bierut

No 1070, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. JEL Classification: E58, D71, D78

Keywords: Bank of England; federal open market committee; monetary policy committee; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-mon
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1070.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20091070

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from European Central Bank 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Official Publications ().