Between capture and discretion - The determinants of distressed bank treatment and expected government support

Magdalena Ignatowski, Josef Korte and Charlotte Werger

No 1835, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze how sources of political influence relate to the actual regulatory treatment of distressed banks and to the expectation of bank support provided by the government. We assemble a unique dataset that links U.S. banks JEL Classification: D72, G21, G28

Keywords: bank regulation; bank sources of influence; lobbying; Prompt Corrective Action; regulatory discretion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1835.en.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20151835

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from European Central Bank 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Official Publications ().