Forbearance vs foreclosure in a general equilibrium model
Bianca Barbaro and
Patrizio Tirelli ()
No 2531, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank
We build a business cycle model characterized by endogenous firms dynamics, where banks may prefer debt renegotiation, i.e. non-performing exposures, to outright borrowers default. We find that debt renegotiations only do not have adverse effects in the event of financial crisis episodes, but a large share of non-performing firms is associated with a sharp deterioration of economic activity in two cases. First, if there are congestion effects in banks ability to monitor non-performing loans. Second, if such loans adversely affect the commercial banks’ moral hazard problem due to their opacity. Aggressive interest rate reductions and quantitative easing limit defaults and the output contraction caused by a financial crisis, without ad- verse effects on the entry of new, more productive firms. The model shows that the observed long-run trend in the share of non-performing loans might be caused by the persistent reduction in technological advancements which drive firm entry rates and firms turnover. JEL Classification: E32, E44, E50, E58
Keywords: DSGE model; financial frictions; firms entry; non-performing loans; quantitative easing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20212531
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