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DSGE Nash: solving Nash games in macro models

Massimo Ferrari Minesso and Maria Sole Pagliari

No 2678, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This paper presents DSGE Nash, a toolkit to solve for pure strategy Nash equilibria of global games in macro models. Although primarily designed to solve for Nash equilibria in DSGE models, the toolkit encompasses a broad range of options including solutions up to the third order, multiple players/strategies, the use of user-de_ned objective functions and the possibility of matching empirical moments and IRFs. When only one player is selected, the problem is re-framed as a standard optimal policy problem. We apply the algorithm to an open-economy model where a commodity importing country and a monopolistic commodity producer compete on the commodities market with limits to entrance. If the commodity price becomes relevant in production, the central bank in the commodity importing economy deviates from the _rst best policy to act strategically. In particular, the monetary authority tolerates relatively higher commodity price volatility to ease barriers to entry in commodity production and to limit the market power of the dominant exporter. JEL Classification: C63, E32, E61

Keywords: computational economics; DSGE model; optimal policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cmp, nep-dge and nep-gth
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