Risky collateral and default probability

Salvatore Perdichizzi, Alessio Reghezza, Martina Spaggiari, Kostas Koufopoulos and Danny McGowan

No 3167, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: We use a novel data set containing all corporate loans throughout the Eurozone to document a series of novel stylized facts on the relationship between collateral and the probability of default. First, we show that the pervasive empirical finding that riskier borrowers pledge collateral is driven by economists’ informational disadvantage relative to banks. Accounting for time-varying bank- and firm-specific risk factors produces negative correlations consistent with theory. Second, the relationship between pledging collateral and the probability of default is non-linear. Increasing the ex-ante collateral-to-loan ratio initially lowers the default likelihood but increases it as loans become overcollateralized. Third, this is driven by the riskiness of collateral. We estimate that an increase in the ex-ante collateral-to-loan ratio correlates with greater variance in the underlying collateral’s market value after loan origination. We develop a model featuring risk-neutral agents and risky collateral that provides intuition for these empirical patterns. Pledging risky collateral lowers lenders’ expected returns in case of default, leading them to demand more collateral to originate a loan but this diminishes a borrower’s return when a project is successful leading to less effort and a higher probability of default. JEL Classification: D82, G21

Keywords: collateral; default; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20263167

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