Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions: the Case of Apex Games

Maria Montero

No 157, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in a class of majority games (apex games) assuming that payoff division can only be agreed upon after forming the coalition (two-stage bargaining) and that negotiations in the coalition can break down and a new coalition be formed (reversible coalitions). In contrast with the results of other two-stage models, all minimal winning coalitions may form and expected payoffs coincide with the per capita nucleolus. These results are robust to small changes in the bargaining procedure. Surprisingly, having a two-stage process (rather than a one-stage process with simultaneous coalition formation and payoff division) benefits the apex player.

Keywords: coalition formation; two-stage bargaining; reversible coalitions; apex games; per capita nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
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Related works:
Working Paper: Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions: The Case of Apex Games (2002)
Working Paper: Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions: The Case of Apex Games (2002)
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